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This thesis analyses the human rights implications of the measures taken by the
Venezuelan government at the Venezuelan-Colombian border during the COVID-19
pandemic. I will argue that the goal of these measures is preventing or impeding the
return of citizens through "deterrence techniques" that have been historically used by
other countries. This case's importance relies on the fact that, unlike other cases, the
Venezuelan government uses these "techniques" against its own nationals, rather than
against unwanted immigrants. The first chapter will provide an overview of the
theoretical framework concerning migration, arguments regarding open borders, and
human rights protections. This will allow me to consider internationally established
definitions, principles, and agreements, both in customary and conventional law, in the
analysis of the Venezuelan case. The second chapter will describe the pre-existent waves
of emigration in Venezuela, the current situation, and the international response to the
on-going crisis, which will explain underlying causes of current migration movements.
The third chapter will discuss the impact of COVID-19 in Colombia and Venezuela and
the measures taken by each government, including a comparison between the declared
states of emergency. Different factors like access to health services, working conditions,
xenophobia, and discrimination, will be an important component as I highlight the
erosion of migrants’ rights and raise concerns regarding potential human rights
violations. In the fourth chapter I will examine the Venezuelan response to returnees and
compare Maduro's government's questionable measures to traditional “prevention
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Venezuela has gone from being called "the land of opportunities"—in reference to
the great amount of immigration and what it had to offer to this new population of
migrants—to experiencing massive emigration of its own citizens due to the lack of
opportunities once existent. For roughly twenty years, Venezuela has experienced the
concept of "crisis" in almost every single sense of the term. Massive violation of human
rights, political instability, shortages and lack of food and other basic products, crime and
corruption, a severely malfunctioning healthcare infrastructure, a destroyed economy
with high levels of hyperinflation, high poverty rates, malnutrition… are some of the
components of this crisis. As a result, many—inordinately many—Venezuelans have
been forced to find a way to survive and subsist. For many the solution has been to
migrate to other countries.
During approximately the past 6 years, Venezuelans have migrated all over the
world. Some have been able to migrate to Europe, others to the United States, but most of
these citizens have had to look for geographically closer opportunities since, for example,
it would be a major financial burden to travel a long distance away from their home
country. Therefore, Latin American countries have become the center of Venezuelan
immigration. Physical geographical borders have played an important role since, as
previously mentioned, it is "easier" to migrate to a closer country. Especially, considering
that many of these migrants do not count with the resources to pay for transportation and
many of them have to walk very long distances and for long periods of time through
harsh conditions to get to their new destination. This fact attests to the degree of despera-
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tion of many Venezuelan citizens, who opt to leave their country, through dangerous and
uncertain journeys, seeking a better quality of life.
Not surprisingly, during this period, Colombia—who has the largest "live" border
with Venezuela—has received a very large number of Venezuelan immigrants.
(Venezuelans typically refer to Colombia as "la hermana república," i.e., the sister
republic, and this highlights the intimate connection between the two nations and their
inhabitants). This most important of Venezuela's neighboring countries has implemented
measures to try help and assist these migrants; however, the COVID-19 pandemic has
worsened the situation not only for one country but for the whole world. After the
pandemic started in March 2020, many countries declared a state of emergency and
everyone entered a new realm of uncertainty. Within Venezuelan borders, the situation
rapidly worsened, even more than its pre-existent crise would have predicted; and the
situation of the undocumented or "irregular" Venezuelan migrants in Colombia did as
well. This is due to the economic collapse brought about by the imposed lockdowns, the
lack of access to health services, and by discrimination and xenophobia, among other
factors. Consequently, many Venezuelan migrants had to face the difficult choice of
staying in Colombia or returning to their home country. Given the highly unusual
circumstances brought about by the pandemic many have chosen the latter.
Many Venezuelan citizens have returned—or at least tried to return—to their
country of origin after the COVID-19 pandemic started. One would think that one will
never be denied access into their own country, since it is a basic moral principle, also en-
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shrined in many international documents, including the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR).1 However, the Venezuelan government has been implementing
questionable measures that could be compared to those outlined and applied in the
"Border Patrol Strategic Plan 1994 and Beyond," published in the United States in the
mentioned year.2 The United States has applied these measures in order to prevent
immigrants from coming into their national territory. Astonishingly, Maduro's
administration has not been applying these so-called techniques to deter foreigners from
entering Venezuela, but to impede its own nationals or citizens from returning into their
own country, thus violating international law. The human rights implications of the
measures that the Maduro regime has either applied or threatened to apply are shocking
and worrisome, and, in fact, the international community has denounced some of them as
crimes against humanity.3 As it turns out, Venezuela has for many years been accused of
many human rights violations and other abuses to its citizens.4 Some of these measures
have included considering stripping returnees of their nationality and property, forcing
them into conditions where they are exposed to the COVID-19 virus, and setting limits
on how many Venezuelan citizens can enter the country in a day. In consequence, Nicolas
Maduro is not only violating international law and agreements that the country has
ratified, he is also violating other human rights of his own fellow citizens.
4 Amnesty International, Venezuela 2019.
Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2021: Venezuela, Events of 2020," 2021.
3 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, "Venezuela: UN report urges
accountability for crimes against humanity," 2020.
2 U.S. Border Patrol, "Border Patrol Strategic Plan 1994 and Beyond," July, 1994.




Right to Freedom of Movement
"La Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen de 1789," a foundational
human civil rights document from the French Revolution, established the first modern
formulation of the right to liberty and its importance.5 The right of freedom of movement
and the right to migrate were not expressly stated in this document; however, the notion
of them originated within the seminal interpretation of the right to liberty in the
declaration.6 The notion of liberty during this period of time in France was of great
importance since censorship and oppression had reigned during the Monarchic period.
Hence, article 4 stated that "liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures
no one else; hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except
those which assure to the other members of the society the enjoyment of the same rights.
These limits can only be determined by law."7 Later, the French Constitution of
September of 1791 included the rights of the previous declaration and also guaranteed the
"freedom of everyone to go, to stay, or to leave, without being halted or arrested in
accordance with procedures established by the Constitution."8 Consequently, this article
of the first French Constitution was the first document to explicitly introduce the idea of
the right to move freely.
8 La Constitution du 3 Septembre 1791, Title 1, 1791.
7 La Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen de 1789, article 4, 1789.
6 McAdam, Jane, "An Intellectual History of Freedom of Movement in International Law: The Right to
Leave as a Personal Liberty," Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol 12, 2011, pp. 12.
5 La Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen de 1789, 1789.
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A century-and-a-half later, on May 2nd of 1948, this right was proclaimed in the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Men. Specifically, article VIII states
that "every person has the right to fix his residence within the territory of the state of
which he is a national, to move about freely within such territory, and not to leave it
except by his own will."9 Subsequently, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) on December 10th of the same year, asserted the right to "freedom of
movement" in article 13(1) and 13(2). Both these articles state both that everyone "has
the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" and that
everyone has "the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country".10 Thus, through this declaration, not only is the general right to freedom of
movement officially recognized by the international community as a fundamental human
right that needs to be universally protected, but so is the specific right to return to one's
country. Moreover, article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) of 1966 further expands on it and states the following: "(1) Everyone lawfully
within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence, (2) Everyone shall be free to leave any
country, including his own, (3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any
restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national
security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of
others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant, [and]
(4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country."11
11 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 12, 1966.
10 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 13, 1948.
9 The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, article VIII, 1948.
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Furthermore, in the General Comment No 27 of the Human Rights Committee of
1999, the right to freedom of movement is again stated and discussed. In this document it
is asserted that "liberty of movement is an indispensable condition for the development of
a person" and that the permissible limitations on this right "must not nullify the principle
of liberty of movement."12 Other declarations and international documents, such as The
Convention on the Rights of the Child (article 10), the International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (articles
5, 8, and 39), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (articles 9 and
18), and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (article 12), also expand on
this freedom and express the importance of its compliance.13 In support of this right,
Joseph Carens highlights that "no liberal state restricts internal mobility. Those states that
do restrict internal mobility are criticized for denying basic human freedoms."14 Thus, he
proceeds to argue that there are no legitimate grounds to restrict freedom of movement
across states, if "freedom of movement within the state is so basic that it overrides the
claims of local political communities."15
15 Carens, Joseph, 1987, pp. 267.
14 Carens, Joseph, "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders," 1987, pp. 267.
13 Claiming Human Rights, "Definitions of the Right of Freedom of Movement," 2009.
12 CCPR General Comment No. 27: article 12 (Freedom of Movement), 1999, pp. 1.
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Migrants
Even though there is no official international legal definition of what a migrant is,
the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs defines it as "someone
who changes his or her country of usual residence, irrespective of the reason for
migration or legal status."16 In addition, the term “crisis migration" was coined in order to
refer to the forms of mobility that occur in the context of a humanitarian crisis, implying
the coexistence of four elements: a certain causality, geography, temporality, and
vulnerability.17 The causality of the movement encompasses "processes that slowly erode
livelihoods [that could lead] to anticipatory movements, which often are perceived as
voluntary migration" and the geographic dimension could translate to the repetition of the
same challenges in the new destination due to factors such as geographical proximity.18
The temporality element will include stages such as the pre-crisis, the stage where the
crisis cannot be prevented, and the migration "in anticipation with worsening
conditions."19 Finally, the vulnerability dimension will consist in "the level of
vulnerability [of the population] and its corollary, resilience."20 Since there exist many
different reasons why an individual or a group thereof may migrate from or to their
country of origin or residency it is of singular importance to consider the elements
described above when analyzing any kind of migration. In addition, and for the purposes
20 Martin, S., Weerasinghe, S., & Taylor, A., 2013, pp. 126-131
19 Gandini, Prieto Rosas; and Lozano-Ascencio, 2020, pp. 103-121.
18 Gandini, Prieto Rosas; and Lozano-Ascencio, 2020, pp. 103-121.
17 Gandini, Prieto Rosas; and Lozano-Ascencio. "Nuevas Movilidades En América Latina: La Migración
Venezolana En Contextos De Crisis Y Las Respuestas En La Región." Cuadernos Geográficos De La
Universidad De Granada, vol. 59, no. 3, 2020, pp. 103-121.
Martin, S., Weerasinghe, S., & Taylor, A., Crisis Migration, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 2013,
pp.123- 137.
16 United Nations, Toolkit on International Migration, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2012,
pp. 2.
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of this thesis, it is essential to engage in a deeper examination of the concept of a
humanitarian crisis, since this will provide a better understanding of the elements
involved in those migrations.
According to a guide issued by the International Commission of Jurists, different
groups of migrants can be identified as: regular migrants, undocumented migrants,
asylum seekers or refugees, and other migrants needing protection.21 First, the broad
category of "regular migrants" is defined in this guide as "migrants who enter the State
after having obtained an authorization, whether temporary or not, by the destination
State."22 Second, "undocumented migrants" are defined as "migrants who enter the State
in an irregular fashion, without having the proper documentation; or migrants who
entered in a regular fashion whose authorization has expired and who have remained,
nonetheless, in the national territory."23 Third, "asylum seekers and refugees" are
described as "migrants who enter a country, whether regularly or irregularly, in order to
escape persecution in their country of origin as defined by article 1(A) of the Geneva
Refugee Convention."24 Finally, the category of "other migrants needing protection"
"includes several kinds of migrants whose status is not well-defined but who are in need
of international protection, recognized, to varying extents, by international law."25 This
category comprises migrants with a "stateless" status, victims of human trafficking,
smuggled individuals, unaccompanied children whose status is unknown, failed
asylum-seekers or "undocumented migrants who cannot be expelled due to principle of
25 Martin, S., Weerasinghe, S., & Taylor, A., 2013, pp. 126-131
24 Martin, S., Weerasinghe, S., & Taylor, A., 2013, pp. 126-131
23 Martin, S., Weerasinghe, S., & Taylor, A., 2013, pp. 126-131
22 Martin, S., Weerasinghe, S., & Taylor, A., 2013, pp. 126-131
21 International Commission of Jurists, Migration and International Human Rights Law: A Practitioners’
Guide, 2014, pp. 39-40.
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non-refoulement," and others.26 The principle of non-refoulment, contained in article 33
of the 1951 Refugee Convention, establishes that individual must not be returned to
countries where they may face torture or risks to their "life[s] or freedom[s]."27
Furthermore, it is of high importance to recognize that the status of the individual might
change, either because of the given circumstances or by personal choice of the migrant.
In addition, article 14(1) of the UDHR states that "everyone has the right to seek
and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution."28 According to the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a refugee is defined as "someone
who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence.
[An individual with] a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group."29 The 1951
Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, responded to this persecution based on race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion and
gave a basis or rationale for the rights of refugees, as well as the legal obligations of
States to protect them.30 An asylum seeker is then defined as a "person within a State
party [i.e., a state that has signed the Convention] who has applied for recognition as a
refugee. If the asylum seeker is determined to meet the definition of a refugee they are
granted asylum."31
31 International Justice Resource Center, "Asylum and the Rights of Refugees"
30 UNHCR, The Refugee Convention and Protocol, 1951.
29 UNHCR, The Refugee Convention and Protocol, 1951, pp. 3.
28 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 14, 1948.
27 The 1951 Refugee Convention, article 33, 1951.
26 International Commission of Jurists, 2014, pp. 39-40.
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Moreover, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, a non-binding regional
declaration of special importance in Colombia and Venezuela, made advances in the
Latin American context in terms of strengthening protections towards refugees. It
expanded the 1951 Refugee Convention and defined refugees as people forced to flee
their country “because their lives, security, or freedom have been threatened by
generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human
rights, or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”32 Some Latin
American countries—such as Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia, and others—have
aligned their domestic policies with the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and
the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees and have also included the broader definition of
"refugee" into them.
32 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central
America, Mexico and Panama, 1984, pp. 3.
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Domestic Immigration Laws and Human Rights
While immigration policies are guided by international treaties, conventions, and
declarations, it is in the end the sovereign state that constitutes the ultimate entity that
determines who is allowed to immigrate into its borders. No international document
suggests the existence of a capacious right for anyone to enter any country for any
reason.33 Nevertheless, international documents that protect migrants—regardless of their
status—do exist: from refugees to migrant workers, the rights of this individual must be
protected and respected as they are, for example, recognized as inalienable rights by the
UDHR. Specifically, several documents grant rights to migrants merely by virtue of
migrants’ humanity. Some of these are: the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1963), the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (1979), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, the Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(1989), the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families (1990), the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (2006), and the International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2007).34
34 Migration Data Portal, "Migrants Rights," 2020. https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/migrant-rights
33 Heath Wellman, Christopher, "Freedom of Movement and the Rights to Enter and Exit," Migration in
Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 80.
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In addition, the right of people to move freely and to seek refuge and asylum in
several specific cases, such as persecution, war, or violence is asserted in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and many other international instruments. Consequently,
various international resources recognize that the migrant is a subject of rights and often
describe certain special protections when dealing with vulnerable situations.35 Some of
these key documents are the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention no. 97
concerning Migration for Employment (1949), the previously mentioned Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and its 1967 Protocol, the Convention Relating
to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954), the Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness (1961), the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Seas (1974),
ILO Convention no. 143 concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion
of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (1975), the International
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) (1979), United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (1982), the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), the Protocol against the Smuggling of
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (2000), and the Convention concerning Decent Work for
Domestic Workers (2011).36
36 Migration Data Portal, 2020.
35 International Justice Resource Center, "Immigration and Migrants' Rights"
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Freedom of Association and Border Control
In addition to the existence of these instruments in the international arena, experts
and academics have developed arguments regarding the right of a state to close, or open,
their borders to immigration. Philosopher Christopher Heath Wellman supports the theory
that states possess and enjoy the right of freedom of association, and consequently hold
the right to control immigration over their territorial borders.37 Wellman bases his
argument on proving the importance of this right on an individual level as well as a
group’s entitlement to the aforementioned. He also acknowledges some clear differences
between the individual and the collective levels, and explores some possible
counterarguments to his theory. However, he ultimately argues that states being groups of
citizens, translates to the right of association—or in this case disassociation, or the right
to exclude—of the state itself since it is a group of citizens allowed to exercise their right
to self-determination. He supports the right of a country to even "close its doors to all
potential immigrants, even refugees desperately seeking asylum" and instead choosing to
“export justice.”38 He proceeds to explain this could be done through intervention, either
by sending aid to the countries suffering from poverty or intervening, militarily if
necessary, in “incompetent or corrupt political regimes that are either unable or unwilling
to protect their citizens' basic moral rights.”39 However, , as the title of her essay states,
philosopher Sarah Fine discusses why she believes that Freedom of Association is not the
answer and, therefore, Heath Wellman’s case does not provide enough evidence—or
39 Heath Wellman, 2008, pp. 109
38 Heath Wellman, 2008, pp. 109 and 129
37 Heath Wellman, Christopher, “Immigration and Freedom of Association,” Ethics, The University of
Chicago, 2008, pp. 109-141.
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sufficiently compelling arguments—as to why a country should enjoy such an extensive
right to limit, and prohibit, immigration into its territory. For one of her main arguments
against this theory, Fine quotes Wellman's conviction that individuals "should be allowed
to choose freely when [their behavior] is not harmful to others," however she argues that
"exclusion from the state obviously has the potential to harm the interests of others."40 If
would-be immigrants, or specifically refugees, live in terrible and unacceptable
conditions, then it would cause greater harm to exclude them. She argues that in these
circumstances there is a moral obligation to let them into a new country. Additionally, she
quotes Carens and raises the concern that "people might have powerful reasons to want to
migrate from one state to another."41 Her following argument, outlined in section IV of
her essay, highlights the importance of a "justification of the state's territorial rights."42
She explains that Wellman's argument raises a question about the state's relationship to its
territory, which she believes Wellman does not consider this relationship as one of
ownership. Therefore, the question of whether "citizens and/or their states have the
relevant rights over the territory from which they wish to exclude others and thus whether
they are within their rights not just to control the rules of membership but also to control
settlement" needs to be addressed by Wellman in order to build a more compelling
argument.43 In conclusion, she believes that freedom of association alone cannot be the
only defense in the case of a state restricting access and excluding individuals from its
43 Fine, Sarah, 2010, pp. 354.
42 Fine, Sarah, 2010, pp. 340.
41 Carens, Joseph, 1987, pp. 258.
40 Heath Wellman, 2008, pp. 128-129
Fine, Sarah,  "Freedom of Association Is Not the Answer*," The University of Chicago, 2010, pp.
355-356.
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territory and, therefore, it cannot "deliver a right" for the exercise of the
aforementioned.44
44 Fine, 2010, pp. 356.
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Right to Return (as a Citizen)
The consideration of the debate between Wellman and Fine offers us the
opportunity to reflect on the possibility of a state having the right to control their
territorial borders and, thus, deny or restrict entry to immigrants. However, it is important
to note that only "immigrants" are mentioned in these scenarios, which allows us to
assume that citizens should not have any problems when leaving or entering their country
of nationality—a principle that is also in accordance to the letter and spirit of the legal
instruments I have mentioned above. In fact, international law has outlined this right and
how "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his [or her] own country."45
Crucially, as mentioned previously, article 13(2) of the UDHR states that every individual
has "the right to...return to his country."46 The European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms mentions in article 3(2) of Protocol No. 4 that
"no one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a
national."47 The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination supports and reiterates the existence and importance of this right in article
5(d)(ii).48 The Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to Leave and Return describes how
"permanent legal residents who temporarily leave their country of residence shall not be
arbitrarily denied the right to return to that country."49 These are some of the international
documents that outline the right of a citizen or national to return to their country; its
49 Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to Leave and Return, 1986
48 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, article 5(d)(ii), 1969.
47 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Protocol No. 4,
article 3(2), 1953.
46 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 13(2), 1948.
45 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 12, 1966.
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repetition throughout treaties and international documents implies the importance of its
implementation and practice.
According to Hurst Hannum, an expert in international law, "the right to return to
the country of which one is a citizen—to return home—is equally fundamental [as the
right to leave one's country] in exercising one's personal autonomy."50 Moreover, he
mentions how restrictions in such rights are considered legitimate if "imposed for limited
purposes in a fair a non-discriminatory manner," and mentions the prevention of the
spreading of a disease as an example.51 However, this exemption will be discussed to
provide an argument as to why this does not apply to the Venezuelan case. In addition to
the previously mentioned international instruments, article 50 of the Venezuelan
Constitution acknowledges that "every person [has the right to] move freely and by any
means through the national territory, change their domicile and residence, leave the
Republic and return…with no limitations other than those established by
law…Venezuelans may enter the country without the need for any authorization. No act
of the Public Power may establish the penalty of being banished from the national
territory against Venezuelans."52 First, this constitutional article unequivocally states the
right to freedom of movement inside and outside of the national borders. Second, this
article unequivocally recognizes the right to return as a citizen without the need of an
authorization or any kind of permission, thus being in accordance with the international
52 Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, article 50, 1999.
51 Hannum, Hurst, 1987, pp. 4.
50 Hannum, Hurst, The Right to Leave and Return in International Law and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1987, pp. 4.
The US Supreme Court's decision on the case Tropp v Dulles, which concluded on the idea of expatriation
as a cruel and unusual penal remedy, will be later discussed to support the importance of citizenship and its
attendant rights.
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law resources exposed above. Finally, the article unequivocally asserts that there is no




Waves of Venezuelan Emigration
According to a report that studied the Venezuelan migration trends from 2000 to
2017, the country has faced three different waves of emigration since President Hugo
Chávez took power in 1999.53 Factors such as "growing insecurity, political tensions,
nationalization of various industries, and social polarization after a failed coup d'etat
attempt in 2002" were the main cause of the first identified wave (2000-2012).54 It is
important to note that the previously mentioned coup d'etat is a contested issue since it
was defined by the Supreme Court as a "power vacuum" or "power void."55 This term is
used to refer to the absence of government, or in this case head of state, in specific
circumstances like a military coup, but also like a resignation—and Chavez's Minister of
Defense did address the nation informing that Chavez had resigned.56 Given the
circumstances, this emigration wave was largely composed of a middle-class population
of entrepreneurs and students who migrated mostly to the United States and Europe,
specifically Spain, Italy, and Portugal, "seeking new opportunities."57 The second
identified wave (2012-2015) was caused by the collapse of the commodities boom and
Chávez's reelection as president for the 2007-2013 presidential term. The aforementioned
commodities boom was the period where Latin America experienced a significant boost
57 Vivas Peñalver, Leonardo; Paez, Tomas, 2017, pp. 2.
56 "Renuncia de Chávez anunciada a Venezuela y al mundo por el Gral. Lucas Rincón Romero 12/04/2002,"
https://youtu.be/M8ZAWErmMyU
55 Sentencia nº 38 del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia - Sala Plena de 19 de Septiembre de 2002, 2002.
54 Feline Freier, Luisa, and Nicolas Parent, "The Regional Response to the Venezuelan Exodus," New York,
2019, pp. 57.
53 Vivas Peñalver, Leonardo; Paez, Tomas, "The Venezuelan Diaspora, Another Impending Crisis?,"
Freedom House, 2017, pp. 2.
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in terms of trade. As a consequence of this collapse, the economic crisis began in earnest
and political repression, which had been gradually increasing since Chavez assumed
power, increased exponentially in the country. Moreover, serious shortages of food and
medicine emerged. In this phase, migrants’ profiles were more varied, representing both
middle and lower classes. Preferred destinations continue to include the United States and
Europe, but added also some nearby countries in Latin America such as Colombia,
Panama, and the Dominican Republic as well. This wave is identified as "growing
hopelessness."58 Furthermore, after Chávez’s death in 2013, Nicolás Maduro assumed the
presidency and conditions in Venezuela significantly worsened. The third and current
phase of Venezuelan emigration started in 2015 as the humanitarian crisis came to its
worst point. Authors generally refer to this wave as the "migration of despair."59 Several
reasons for this migration include, but are not limited to, "scarcity of food and medicines
at critical levels; hunger, future compromised by malnutrition, [and] increasing deaths by
scarcity; insecurity; [and] political hopelessness".60 During this wave, people belonging to
all social spectrums have emigrated, however the low-income class has constituted a
greater percentage of it given their greater vulnerability.61
According to data from the UNHCR, at least 133,000 Venezuelans formally
requested refugee status in other countries between 2014 and 2017.62 However, another
363,000 are added because of other "legal alternatives" offered to Venezuelans especially
62 France 24, "Líderes de América se reúnen para analizar la situación de los refugiados," Brasilia, 2018.
61 Vivas Peñalver, Leonardo; Paez, Tomas, 2017, pp. 2.
60 Feline Freier and Parent, 2019, pp. 57.
59 Feline Freier and Parent, 2019, pp. 57.
58 Feline Freier and Parent, 2019, pp. 57.
20
by Latin American countries.63 More recently, the R4V Coordination Platform for
Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V Platform) reported on March 5th, 2021,
5,577,077 Venezuelan migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers reported by host
governments.64 Venezuela's reported population in 2019, was 28.515.829 individuals
according to the World Bank data catalog.65 This reveals that the emigration data
encompasses a monumentally high number of migrants, considering the size of the
Venezuelan population. The flow of Venezuelan citizens forced to travel to neighboring
countries to access the most basic goods and needs increased since Maduro assumed the
presidency and at least 606,000 Venezuelans had formally sought asylum, mostly in Peru,
Brazil and the USA.66
66 Amnesty International, Venezuela 2019.
65 World Bank Data catalog, datacatalog.worldbank.org
64 R4V Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, 2021.
63 Heredia, Jassir, Battistessa, Diego, "La nueva realidad migratoria venezolana," Revista electrónica
iberoamericana, 2018, pp. 5.
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The Venezuelan Situation
As mentioned previously, the Venezuelan political and human rights crisis, added
to a particularly low quality of life, have been the main reason for the last emigration
wave during Maduro’s presidency. Human rights violations have been constant in the
country since Hugo Chavez's assumed the presidency, and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have
continuously denounced the situation regarding this subject.67 In order to expand on the
human rights crisis in Venezuela, the following topics will be discussed in the following
order: extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detentions, excessive
use of force and torture methods, lack of judicial guarantee, impunity, criminalization of
the opposition, imprisonment of prisoners of conscience, censorship, and violation of the
rights of indigenous peoples.
The right to life is both stated and protected under article 3 of the UDHR, article
43 of the Venezuelan Constitution, and many other documents.68 Consequently, the
deliberate killings that State agents have committed in Venezuela for several years are
considered a violation of this right and, therefore, a violation of an inalienable and
non-derogable right under International Humanitarian Law. According to a United
Nations' report, "even conservative estimates suggest that Venezuela has one of Latin
America’s highest rates of killings by State agents."69 According to the Human Rights
69 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, "Venezuela: UN report urges
accountability for crimes against humanity," 2020.
68 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 3, 1948.
Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, article 43, 1999.
67 Amnesty International, Venezuela 2019.
Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2021: Venezuela, Events of 2020," 2021.
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Watch report World Report 2011: Venezuela, "law enforcement agents allegedly killed
7,998 people between January 2000 and the first third of 2009," which allows us to
conclude that these extrajudicial killings started in earnest during Chavez's presidency
and have steadily continued to rise during Maduro's administration.70 Another report by
the Organization of American States (OAS) confirmed 18,093 extrajudicial executions
from 2014 to 2020.71
During 2014, peaceful protests took place after Nicolás Maduro narrowly won the
2013 presidential elections against opposition leader Henrique Capriles Radonski. Later,
several events like the death of former Miss Venezuela Monica Spears and her family and
the alleged attempted rape of a university student in the state of Táchira took place and
caused generalized fear and a feeling of helplessness and rage in the country.72 However,
these protests were caused by the combination of these events and many other different
reasons, such as the increase in violence, political discontent, inflation, shortages of basic
goods, and others. These elements led to a set of street protests by students in San
Cristóbal, Táchira in February 2014 that later extended to the rest of the country.73 On
February 12 of the same year, the Venezuelan opposition called for a march in the
country, mainly in Caracas—the capital.74 During this protest, and all the following ones
until May, extrajudicial executions were recorded while the government alleged
“resistance to authority,” starting with the deaths of students Bassil Da Costa and Robert
74 Human Rights Watch, "Venezuela: Investigate Violence During Protests," 2014.
73 BBC, 2014.
72 Galluzzo, Mauro, "Venezuela: the most dangerous place on earth?" 4 News, 2014.
BBC, "Venezuela forces 'clear' protest city of San Cristobal," 2014.
71 Organization of American States, “Fostering Impunity: The Impact of the Failure of the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court to Open an Investigation Into the Possible Commission of Crimes Against
Humanity in Venezuela,” Washington, 2020.
70 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2011: Venezuela, 2011.
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Redman.75 According to the Venezuelan Observatory of Social Conflict (OVCS), 9,286
protests took place in 2014.76 Based on the investigations stated in the Human Rights
Council report, it is possible to conclude that extrajudicial killings likely kept happening
even after these events ceased, and that the numbers have continued to rise.77
Many cases that did not end in extrajudicial killings have led to enforced
disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and excessive use of force and torture methods by
security forces. The same Human Rights Council report brings to light the fact that
Venezuela is a party to the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of
Persons, a multilateral treaty that aspires to combat the forced disappearance of
individuals.78 Moreover, article 45 of the Venezuelan Constitution establishes that "the
public authorities, whether military, civilian or of any other kind, even during a state of
emergency, exception or restriction or guarantees, are prohibited from effecting,
permitting or tolerating the forced disappearance of persons."79 Furthermore, article 9 of
the ICCPR guarantees the right against arbitrary or unlawful detention and article 44 of
the Venezuelan Constitution establishes that personal liberty is inviolable and then
proceeds to explain the prohibition of arbitrary detentions.80 Finally, article 5 of the
UDHR states that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
80 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 9, 1966.
Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, article 44, 1999.
79 Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, article 45, 1999.
78 Human Rights Council, 2020.
77 Human Rights Council, 2020.
76 Human Rights Council, "Detailed findings of the independent international fact finding mission on the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela," 2020.
75 Amnesty International, "Bassil Da Costa Frías: conmemoración de su muerte durante participación en
una manifestación del 12F 2014," 2018.
El Nacional, "Los estudiantes recordaron a Bassil Da Costa y Robert Redman el Día de la Juventud," 2021.
Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2021: Venezuela, Events of 2020," 2021.
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treatment or punishment" and the Venezuelan Constitution also supports this in its 46
article.81 As it was previously mentioned, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions,
and excessive use of force and torture are prohibited under international law since they
are considered jus cogens norms—human rights that have an inviolable character—and
punished by Venezuelan domestic laws. However, these legal instruments have not
stopped these violations from happening in the country. Between 2014 and 2020, 15,501
cases of arbitrary detention, 653 cases of torture, with credible reports suggesting even
thousands of cases, and, between 2018 and 2019, 724 instances of enforced
disappearance were documented by the OAS.82 Torture techniques include, but are not
limited to, "stress [or submission] positions, asphyxiation, beatings, electric shocks, cuts
and mutilations; death threats; and psychological torture."83 In addition, excessive use of
indiscriminate and disproportionate force against peaceful protesters between 2014 and
2020 has also been documented and many media recordings available to the public
confirm them.84
Not only these human rights violations happen in Venezuela, but they are also not
punished according to the laws when they occur. Consequently, another big problem and
violation that derives from these is the absence of effective judicial guarantees in the
country. According to the Venezuelan Constitution, "the State is obliged to investigate
and legally punish offenses against human rights committed by its authorities. Actions to
84 Human Rights Watch, "Venezuela: Violence Against Protesters, Journalists," 2014.
83 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, "Venezuela: UN report urges
accountability for crimes against humanity," 2020.
82 Organization of American States, “Fostering Impunity: The Impact of the Failure of the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court to Open an Investigation Into the Possible Commission of Crimes Against
Humanity in Venezuela,” Washington, 2020.
81 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 5, 1948.
Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, article 46, 1999.
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punish crimes against humanity offenses, serious violations of human rights and war
crimes shall not be subject to statute of limitations. Human rights violations and the
offense of crimes against humanity shall be investigated and adjudicated by the courts of
ordinary competence…"85 International documents, such as article 14 of the ICCPR and
article 8 from the UDHR, also ensure the right to a fair trial and due process.86
Nevertheless, once more, this is not the reality in practice and several due process
violation cases are, for example, analyzed in the investigations of the Venezuelan case
conducted by the Human Rights Council.87 The OAS report also states that detainees are
regularly "subjected to serious due process violations, including arrest without a warrant,
refusal to inform them of the reason for their arrest, detention without being promptly
brought before a court, denial of access to counsel, incommunicado detention, denial of
the opportunity to call witnesses in one’s defense, denial of the presumption of
innocence, and planted evidence."88 In addition, the authorities often discourage victims
from filing formal complaints to ensure impunity for crimes committed by government
functionaries.89 Human Rights Watch also exposes that between 2017 and 2020 even the
ostensibly co-opted Attorney General’s Office "reported initiating 4,890 investigations
into killings in the context of security operations, of which 13 had resulted in trials and
one in a homicide conviction by March."90 It also reported that "517 state agents [were]
90 Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2021: Venezuela, Events of 2020," 2021.
89 Amnesty International, Venezuela 2019.
88 Organization of American States, “Fostering Impunity: The Impact of the Failure of the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court to Open an Investigation Into the Possible Commission of Crimes Against
Humanity in Venezuela,” Washington, 2020, pp. 64.
87 Human Rights Council, 2020, pp. 298-301.
86 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 14, 1966.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 8, 1948.
An international document that seeks to combat impunity is, for example, the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (1998).
85 Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, article 29, 1999.
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charged and 26 convicted for torture or ill-treatment, and 44 individuals charged and 10
detained while awaiting trial for human rights abuses during protests in 2014, 2017, and
2019."91 Therefore, impunity for human rights violations is the norm in Venezuela given
the lack of judicial independence and the breakdown of the rule of law. There is also
evidence to suggest and believe that the justice system is misused to criminalize those
perceived as opponents of the government.92 Moreover, the use of military jurisdiction to
prosecute civilians or retired military personnel has continued and prisoners of
conscience—imprisoned not because of real crimes, but because of their race, sexual
orientation, religion, or political views—continue to be detained or face restrictions on
their rights."93 These have included journalists and political activists, even though the
UDHR defends —on articles 3, 9, 18, 19, and 20—the fundamental rights that the
concept of prisoners of conscience contradicts.94 According to the 2018 Annual report of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), one of the factors that had
caused venezuelan emigration was also political persecution from the government.95 This
fact indicates the frequency in which citizens have been persecuted for their political
opinions, up to the point of leading them to migrate from their home country.
Venezuela has suffered from a concerning level of censorship since Hugo
Chavez's assumed the presidency, which has gradually worsened with time and
particularly during the Maduro administration. Several media outlets critical of the
government were the targets of censorship during Chavez's presidential term, such as the
95 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, "Chapter IV.B Venezuela," Annual Report 2018, 2018,
pp. 449.
94 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, articles 3, 9, 18, 19, 20, 1948.
93 Amnesty International, Venezuela 2019.
92 Amnesty International, Venezuela 2019.
91 Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2021: Venezuela, Events of 2020," 2021.
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case of the television network RCTV (Radio Caracas Televisión). This network had been
on-air since its inauguration by William H. Phelps on November 15th, 1953 and was
arguably the most popular TV station in Venezuela—and also the one whose signal
reached more homes in the country.96 RCTV had been critical of Chavez's government
and had been accused by Chavez of being complicit in an attempted coup in 2002. In
2007, the ex-president decided not to renew its broadcasting license without previous
reasoning to this decision.97 The government published El Libro Blanco sobre RCTV
attempting to give an explanation to its decision. While this book is filled with
accusations, "it does not cite a single final judicial or administrative ruling establishing
that the channel had in fact committed any of these alleged offenses during its 20–year
contract."98 There were after all no judicial or administrative decisions to that effect,
despite Chavez's grip on the judiciary and the rest of government. National and
international organizations set their sights on this case, considering the closure as an
outrage and a violation of freedom of expression.99 Venezuelans also expressed their
support through marches and protests.100 Many other censorship cases have occurred
since then, during the 2014 protests the state of Táchira was left without access to the
internet for 36 hours after 16 days of protests and the media platform Twitter reported
image blocking in the country.101 Another event was the closure of "CNN en Español" in
2017 after the news network presented a special titled "Pasaportes en la sombra." This
101 Díaz, Marianne, "Venezuela: Internet se apaga en Táchira," Global Voices 2014.
USA Today, "Twitter reports image blocking in Venezuela," 2014.
100 Romero, Simón, "Venezuela Police Repel Protests Over TV Network’s Closing," The New York Times,
2007.
99 Organization of American States,  "Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression
expresses concern over the situation of Radio Caracas Television (RCTV) in Venezuela," Press Release
161/06, 2006.
98 Human Rights Watch, Venezuela: TV Shutdown Harms Free Expression, 2007.
97 Human Rights Watch, Venezuela: TV Shutdown Harms Free Expression, 2007.
96 RCTV, www.rctv.net
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special denounced a series of irregularities allegedly committed at the Venezuelan
embassy in Baghdad, Iraq.102 These are only a few of the examples—amongst
many—that could be made in order to conclude that the Venezuelan government has been
censoring and stripping its citizens from their right to freedom of expression, other
examples include cases involving radio stations, other TV networks, and online
platforms.103
Another important area to discuss in terms of human rights violations, is the rights
of Indigenous Peoples in Venezuela. Given the humanitarian crisis, the rights of
indigenous have also been violated and the structural problems that have affected them
for years have worsened. The rights of Indigenous Peoples are not respected—much less
guaranteed. The presence of military personnel, organized criminal gangs, and armed
groups in indigenous territories cause violence and insecurity. In February 2016, Maduro
created in the "Arco Minero" (Orinoco Mining Arc) a "strategic development zone."104
The Arco Minero consists of a 118.843 km² region of Venezuelan territory, specifically
located on the southern part between the Orinoco River, Bolívar state and part of the
Amazonas state.105 According to reports, illegal mining operations carried out without
official permission and labor or environmental regulations have been the reality of this
project and indigenous groups have suffered the consequences.106
106 Amnesty International, Venezuela 2019.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, "Chapter IV.B Venezuela," Annual Report 2018, 2018, pp.
492, 493, 494.
105 El Tiempo, "Historia del Arco Minero del Orinoco y su turbia relación con Maduro," 2019.
104 NPR, "Venezuela Trudges Ahead With Risky 'Gold Rush' Despite Sanctions," 2018.
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In an interview, Antonio de Lisio, geographer and professor at the Central
University of Venezuela, said that "the Arco Minero is misnamed because there are not
only—or even mainly—minerals there. Eighty percent of the surface in the area is forest,
trees, thus offering a great resource for air purification. Venezuela's largest rivers are also
in this region. The incorrectly labeled Arco Minero is a vital space for the survival of
indigenous groups, who are struggling mightily to have their territorial rights
recognized.”107 Furthermore, the Center for Strategic and International Studies stated that
Maduro's regime benefits from illicit mining since it involves "state-owned enterprises,
such as Minerven and Compañía Anónima Militar para las Industrias Mineras,
Petrolíferas y de Gas (CAMIMPEG), which source minerals from illicit mines and export
them officially to other countries, most notably Turkey and the United Arab Emirates."108
In addition to this illegal mining issue, "Pranes (prison gang leaders), megabandas (large
criminal gang organizations with over 50 members), sindicatos (gangs originally
connected to powerful labor unions), colectivos (paramilitary groups), the National
Liberation Army (ELN), and dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC)" are present in the region together with military presence from the government
and affect the safety of the Indigenous groups in the area.109 Experts also believe these
activities are directly linked to the poverty rates in the exploited region.110
110 Amnesty International, Venezuela 2019.
109 Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Illegal Mining in Venezuela: Death and Devastation in
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These massive violations of political, civil, economic, and social rights have been
also reflected in shortages and lack of access to food and medicines, and the deterioration
in health services and the exodus of the health personnel, which had led to
undernourishment of the population, child malnutrition, and restricted access to drinking
water and sanitation. In addition, hyperinflation has also contributed to the
aforementioned problems in the country. Venezuela's hyperinflation started in November
2016 and it has climbed to 3012% in March of 2021.111 Currently, the established
minimum wage is $2.40 per month at the official exchange rate, however, much of the
country subsists through the black market's US dollar's exchange rate and not through the
official government's rate.112 There is a clear variation and difference between
Venezuela's current minimum wage and its neighboring South-American countries. For
example, data shows that Colombia's minimum wage is $261, Ecuador's is $400, and
Brazil's—being the lowest before Venezuela—is $207, almost a hundred times higher.113
Through this comparison it is easier to visualize how exorbitantly low Venezuelan's
minimum wage really is. Hyperinflation, together with economic and social policies,
reduced food production and weakened distribution systems. The UN Food and
Agriculture Organization reported that 9,1 million Venezuelans were undernourished on a
3-year average from 2017-2019.114 According to Amnesty International, "food
distribution systems, such as the Local Supply and Production Committees (CLAPs),
114 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of),"
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#country/236
113 Statista, "Minimum Monthly Wage in Selected Latin American Countries in 2021 (in U.S. Dollars)."
Statista, Statista Inc., 14 Jan 2021.
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continued to fail to meet nutritional needs and operated according to politically
discriminatory criteria."115 Moreover, The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
warned in 2018 that a "growing number of children" are experiencing malnutrition given
the circumstances in the country and called for more action from the government given
the "worrisome decline in children’s nutritional wellbeing."116
As it is mentioned in another Human Rights Watch report, "it is impossible to
know yet the full extent of the health and food crises in Venezuela" because "Venezuelan
authorities have failed to publish health and nutrition data."117 Serious shortages in basic
health services and medicines, as well as the exodus of health personnel, has affected
people’s ability to access health care. The maternal mortality ratio (number of maternal
deaths per 100,000 live births) was 125.0 in 2017, being very likely that it has increased
given the worsening circumstances since that year.118 Furthermore, the mortality rate for
children under 5-years old is 24.2 deaths per 1,000 live births.119 The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) reports a breakdown of the medical infrastructure in
Venezuela and published data that informs of over 1,000 confirmed cases of measles and
over 400,000 reported cases of malaria in 2017, and over 1,600 suspected cases of
diphtheria from 2017 to 2019.120 Hospitals lack supplies, medicines, and even running
water and electricity, making it very difficult, if not downright impossible, for the person-
120 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Health Infrastructure Breakdown in Venezuela," 2018.
119 UNICEF, UNICEF Data: Monitoring the situation of children and women, Venezuela (Bolivarian
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nel to do their job successfully.121 75% of public health care centers do not receive water
continuously, or at all.122 Access to all types of contraception is extremely limited and, in
some cases, non-existent.123 According to an article published in El Pais, Venezuelans
turn to "santería," a pantheistic Afro-Cuban folk religion developed from the beliefs and
customs of the Yoruba people and incorporating some elements of the Catholic religion,
to treat their illnesses.124 In combination with the limited access to food and proper
healthcare services, which have led to a great amount of deaths, there also exists a
restricted access to drinking water and sanitation that continues to affect a significant part
of the population. A New York Times research found that a third of collected water
samples did not even meet national norms.125 Data from 2018 suggests that 82% of the
population, equivalent to 28,621,000 people, do not receive water in a continuous way
and the one received is of doubtful quality or not drinkable.126
Consequently, malnourishment, child malnutrition, the emergence of previously
eradicated diseases, an increase in deaths from preventable diseases, and an increase in
maternal and infant mortality rates, are part of the evidence of the increased poverty rates
in the country.127 The 2018 National Survey of Living Conditions (ENCOVI, for
Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida) found that 75% of the country's population is
127 Amnesty International, Venezuela 2019.
126 CEPAZ, Emergencia Humanitaria Compleja en Venezuela: Derecho al Agua," 2018, pp. 1.
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in poverty, according to their income.128 In the following 2019-2020 report, this number
increased to 96% of the population.129
Despite the entire crisis described above, the government continued to refuse to
recognize the gravity of the situation and, most of the time, accept assistance from
humanitarian organizations. These factors are the main reason for the most recent
emigration wave or exodus of Venezuelans in the past few years; the citizens started to
migrate to other countries looking for alternatives and a better quality of life. In the First
Chapter, specifically on the "Migrants" section, different coexistent elements in the
context of mobility in a humanitarian crisis were explained. These were: causality,
geography, temporality, and vulnerability. The causality of this migratory wave
encompasses, not only the present conditions, but also the rapid decline and deterioration
rate of the country during the past years. Thus, first leading to what could be identified as
"voluntary migration" and now changing to a necessary one. For the purposes of this
thesis, the geographic dimension has a great amount of relevance since Venezuela and
Colombia share a physical border, therefore, geographical proximity could act as a
negative component since the same challenges could repeat in the new destination, in this
case Colombia. In the Venezuelan situation description, it is possible to easily identify the
relevant phases, the pre-crisis and the crisis itself—where the humanitarian crisis cannot
be prevented anymore and migration becomes practically a necessity instead of a
possibility based on a personal choice. Finally, the vulnerability dimension is clear since
the population is exposed to all the aforementioned elements of the crisis on a daily basis.
129 Share America, "Under Maduro, nearly all Venezuelans live in poverty," 2020.
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The International Response
These circumstances in Venezuela have caught the attention of the international
community for several years.130 Many different reports and studies have been mentioned
through this thesis as evidence of the previous statement. Moreover, several countries
have imposed sanctions on the Venezuelan government and NGOs have continuously
reported the crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Venezuelan government, as well
as the deplorable living conditions in the country. A series of protests took place in 2017,
after the general international community did not recognize Maduro's government as
legitimate and Maduro imposed himself in power despite the international pressure and
national discontent, and other related events.131 In the midst of these events, the United
States sent aid, food and medical supplies, to the country through the
Venezuelan-Colombian border—specifically through the city of Cúcuta.132 Since Maduro
had actively denied the humanitarian crisis in the country, the government blocked the
route and did not let the aid into the country's side of the border.133 Later, clashes between
the Venezuelan military and those trying to clear the pathway started and the aid was
"accidentally" burned during these events.134
In that same year, the former United States' president Donald Trump threatened
Maduro's government with the possibility of a military intervention. “We’re all over the
134 The Conversation, "Venezuela: indigenous people are forgotten victims of crisis," 2019.
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world and we have troops all over the world in places that are very very far away,
Venezuela is not very far away and the people are suffering and dying. We have many
options for Venezuela including a possible military option if necessary,” said Trump.135
However, these threats did not materialize. Furthermore, the United Nations' Security
Council discussed Venezuela's political situation regarding elections and failed to get to
an agreement, since Russia vetoed the United State's draft resolution and the Russian
draft resolution failed to have the necessary amount of votes in favor to pass.136
As it was discussed in the first chapter in the section titled "Freedom of
Association and Border Control," Heath Wellman believes in "exporting justice" as a
possible solution. Aid has been sent to Venezuela on multiple occasions, rarely being
accepted. On occasion, the aid that has been sent, has been burned, or otherwise
destroyed; conversations and mediation have been offered and have taken place through
and/or with the intervention of intermediaries, the United States almost militarily
intervened in the country and studies suggest that this would have not necessarily be the
best option.137 Consequently, after exposing the Venezuelan case it could be possible to
conclude that his premise does not have the necessary strength to hold itself as true.
Finally, article 23 of the Venezuelan Constitution states that "the treaties, pacts
and conventions relating human rights which have been executed and ratified by
Venezuela have a constitutional rank, and prevail over internal legislation, insofar as they
contain provisions concerning the enjoyment and exercise of such rights that are more fa-
137 The Conversation, "Venezuela: indigenous people are forgotten victims of crisis," 2019.
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vorable than those established by this Constitution and the laws of the Republic, and shall
be immediately and directly applied by the courts and other organs of the Public Power."
This article allows us to clearly see the relationship between Venezuela and its lack of
adherence towards international law, since neither national laws nor international ratified




Inmigration and COVID-19 in Colombia
The latest "migration of despair" wave of Venezuelan emigration has occurred
during Maduro's presidential term. Given the geographical proximity and other related
elements, Colombia has been one of the main destinations for Venezuelans. One of the
supporters of this theory is Professor Iván de la Vega, director of the International
Migration Laboratory located in Simón Bolivar University in Caracas, who considers that
Colombia is the main destination for Venezuelans, not only in Latin America but in the
entire world.138 In support of this argument, the R4V Platform reports that Colombia is
the country with more venezuelan migrants with a total number of 759,584 individuals
recorded on January 31st, 2021.139
According to a New York Times article, "Latin America accounted for 35 percent
of all coronavirus deaths in the world" during the week of April 19th, 2021.140 Since the
COVID-19 pandemic started in March 2020, it is not possible to deny how the whole
world, but more specifically, Latin American countries have been affected socially,
economically, and politically thanks to pre-existent crises. Furthermore, the pandemic has
"highlighted a denial of migrants’ rights" and has raised concerns about human rights in
the region. The Colombian government has tried to include the Venezuelan population of
immigrants into their pandemic response plan. However, after the decree of a mandatory
140 The New York Times, "After a Year of Loss, South America Suffers Worst Death Tolls Yet," 2021.
139 R4V Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, 2021.
138 Subero, Carlos, "Así ha cambiado la emigración del venezolano desde 2013," USB Noticias, 2017.
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quarantine, given the economic consequences of the lockdown, most Venezuelan
migrants are struggling to survive in Colombia.141 With no more than a few public
policies designed to support their re-integration, the venezuelan migrants encounter
difficulties entering the formal labour market. The prospect of homelessness, destitution,
violence and recruitment into criminal gangs is real.142 A Venezuelan migrant stated in an
interview that they "won't have any way to earn an income because of the virus,
otherwise [they] would not return to [their] country."143 Access to health services is not
guaranteed for this group of migrants despite its recognition as a human right in the
UDHR. Colombia only grants full access to healthcare to documented migrants,
excluding those irregular or undocumented. According to the article "Protecting Migrants
or Reversing Migration? COVID-19 and the risks of a protracted crisis in Latin
America," the irregular or undocumented migrants in the country represent 57 per cent of
the migrant population.144 Moreover, their vulnerabilities are made even worse by
stigmatization, xenophobia, and discrimination. Many NGOs, UN officials, and experts
have pointed out the xenophobia against Venezuelans in Latin American countries due to
the recent massive wave of migration.145 The UNHCR campaign "Somos Panas
Colombia" was launched with the intention of combating this problem. This campaign
focuses on showing "that Venezuelans are PEOPLE who HAD to leave their country and,
145 The New Humanitarian, "Venezuelan migrants face rising xenophobia in Latin America," 2020.
144 Riggirozzi, Grugel, Cintra, 2020.
143 Norigean Refugee Council, "Covid-19 forces migrants and refugees back to crisis-ridden Venezuela,"
2020.
142 Riggirozzi, Grugel, Cintra, 2020.
141 Riggirozzi, Pia; Grugel, Jean; Cintra, Natalia; Situational Brief: Perspective on Migrants' Right to
Health in Latin America during COVID-19, "Protecting Migrants or Reversing Migration? COVID-19 and
the risks of a protracted crisis in Latin America," 2020.
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who are THANKFUL for being accepted in Colombia."146 Furthermore, a study made by
a global development firm named Sayara International, showed that fifty-five of the
146 UNHCR, "Somos Panas Colombia Campaign - Fact Sheet," 2019.
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migrants interviewed in Colombia, which constitutes 32% of the research sample of the
study, claimed that "their human rights had been violated in some way; examples include
episodes of verbal abuse, physical aggression, threat, arbitrary displacement, sexual
harassment, and forced labor, amongst others."147 Due to the pandemic, Colombia and
Venezuela closed their shared border in March and refugees stayed largely trapped, not
being able to leave Colombia and return to their home country.148 However, even with the
shutdown of transportation due to quarantine policies, Venezuelans managed to get from
different parts of Colombia to the border crossing points of Norte de Santander and
Arauca, the only ones that were enabled.
The exponential growth of applications for refugee status in various Latin
American countries by the Venezuelan population, shows that the region was not
prepared for this mass exodus.149 In Colombia, the Special Permit of Permanence (PEP)
and a Border Mobility Card (TMF) were implemented as a way to legalize the
immigration into the country. The PEP is directed to those Venezuelan citizens who
entered the national Colombian territory before August 31, 2020 and in this way the
individual will not have a judicial record in Colombia, nor deportation or expulsion
measures could be implemented.150 Moreover, the TMF card is a document issued by the
Colombian government as a permit for Venezuelans to move freely through Colombian
territory in the border area. However, even measures as important as the PEP, are tempo-
150 Migración Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, "Migración Colombia lanza nuevo permiso especial de
permanencia para venezolanos," 2020.
149 Prieto Rosas and Lozano-Ascencio, 2020.
148 Agencia EFE, Volver a Venezuela desde Colombia, una odisea forzada por el coronavirus, Colombia,
2020.
147 Restrepo Pineda, Jair Eduardo; Jaramillo Jaramillo, Juliana, "Venezuelans in Colombia: understanding
the implications of the migrants' crisis in Maicao (La Guajira)," Sayara International, 2018.
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rary and exceptional, and do not constitute a full legal certainty.151 Moreover, it is also
important to consider that, despite the national and international efforts, the vast majority
of the migrants are considered irregular or undocumented migrants and do not enjoy
general protections from the Colombian government.
Evidently, the Colombian migratory system was not ready to manage a massive
flow of this magnitude.152 During 2018, the Venezuelan migrants situation in Colombia
worsened in such a way that the mayor of Cúcuta, César Rojas, asked the Colombian
president, Juan Manuel Santos, to declare a social emergency due to the large number of
Venezuelans who entered the area and were sleeping in parks, streets, and other public
spaces.153 Santos accepted the proposal by Rojas and other public officials who were
overwhelmed by the massive migratory flows from Venezuela and announced that they
would stop issuing more Border Mobility Cards (TMF), used by citizens of neighboring
regions to cross the national border. In addition, he announced the creation of the Special
Migration Group (GEM) to reinforce control and security at the border, as well as the
construction of a Migrant Assistance Center with the support of the UN, which initially
would have capacity for 2,000 people.154 The Migrant Assistance Center was inaugurated
on March 8th, 2019 in the border city of Maicao, in La Guajira region.155
155 UNHCR, "UNHCR opens reception centre near Colombian border to assist vulnerable Venezuelans,"
2019.
154 El Tiempo, "Estas son las medidas para afrontar la crisis migratoria," 2018.
153 El Tiempo, "Cúcuta, cerca de emergencia social por venezolanos durmiendo en calles," 2018.
152 Prieto Rosas and Lozano-Ascencio, 2020.
151 Cabrera, D., Cano, G. and Castro, A., Procesos recientes de movilidad humana entre Venezuela y
Colombia 2016-2018, "Crisis y migración de población venezolana. Entre la desprotección y seguridad
jurídica en Latinoamérica," Ciudad de México: UNAM, 2019, pp. 59-94.
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State of Emergency: Venezuela and COVID-19
The UDHR establishes in article 3 the right to life, which is considered a jus
cogens norm—a peremptory norm in which no derogation is permitted.156 The principle
of jus cogens is written in the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and it
specifically states that "a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law."157 This clause demonstrates the
importance of the compliance and the international acceptance of the jus cogens norms,
even in cases where temporary derogation is permitted, such as public emergencies or
armed conflicts. In these cases, two conditions must be met: (1) "the situation must
amount to a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation," and (2) "the State
party must have officially proclaimed a state of emergency."158 The rights that are
considered as non-derogable rights under International Humanitarian law under article 4
of the ICCPR are: article 6 ("every human being has the inherent right to life..."), article 7
("No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment..."), article 8 ("no one shall be held in slavery...no one shall be held in
servitude"), article 11 ("no one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to
fulfil a contractual obligation"), article 15 ("no one shall be held guilty of any criminal
offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence,
under national or international law, at the time when it was committed..."), article 16
("everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law"),
158 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General comment no. 29 states of emergency
(article 4), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 2001.
157 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, Art. 53, 1969.
156 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 3, 1948.
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article 18 ("everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion...").
The Human Rights Council report "Detailed findings of the independent
international fact finding mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela," describes all
the "state of emergency and exceptions" in Venezuela from 2016 until 2020.159 In total, 26
of these have been declared by the country during this period. Recently, in March 2020,
Venezuela declared a state of emergency like many other countries in the world due to the
COVID-19 pandemic.160 This was extended twice, once in May 2020 and another one in
June 2020. Moreover, another two extensions were declared and Venezuela was in a state
of emergency until August 2020.161 According to article 338 of the Venezuelan
Constitution, "a state of alarm may be declared when catastrophes, public calamities or
other similar events occur, seriously endangering the security of the Nation or its
citizens." This statement aligns completely with the global situation, which encompasses
a pandemic. However, the same article proceeds to state that "such state of exception
shall last for up to 30 days, and may be extended for an additional 30 days."162
Consequently, it is possible now to visualize how the second, third and fourth extensions
of the state of emergency contradict the provisions stated in the country's constitution.
Moreover, the decree was not submitted to the National Assembly, contradicting the rest
of article 338, where it is stated that "the National Assembly has the responsibility of the
162 Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, article 338, 1999.
161 McKenzie, Baker, "Venezuela: It is decreed a new State of Alarm throughout the country due to
COVID-19 until October 6, 2020," 2020.
160 Human Rights Council, "Detailed findings of the independent international fact finding mission on the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela," 2020, pp. 37.
159 Human Rights Council, "Detailed findings of the independent international fact finding mission on the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela," 2020, pp. 35-37.
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approval for the extension of the states of exemption."163 In addition, the Venezuelan
government declared a new state of emergency in September 2020.164 These states of
alarm have included transit restrictions, suspension of labor and school activities,
suspension of public events and places of public recreation, commercial flights
suspensions, mandatory use of respiratory masks, quarantine guidelines, suspension of
administrative procedures, and others.165
On the other hand, Colombia has also declared a health state of emergency due to
the pandemic and it was extended until February 2021.166 Nevertheless, it is important to
consider the differences between the declared states of emergency in each country; in
Venezuela—a country where human rights were not guaranteed or protected even after it,
opposed to Colombia—a country where most human rights protections are left and
guaranteed. The health system is not prepared to handle the spread of common diseases,
let alone the virus' effects and its highly contagious component. COVID-19 consequences
combined with the deterioration of health services, limited access to food and potable
water, high poverty rates, inadequate housing structures, lead to conclude that the
situation itself is not given or ideal for a community quarantine in the country in the first
place.
Those Venezuelan citizens who have succeeded in migrating back to their country
of origin (and who wanted to return as a result of the pandemic in Colombia) have faced
166 U.S News & World Report, "Colombia Extends Health State of Emergency Until End of February,"
2020.
165 McKenzie, Baker, 2020.
164 McKenzie, Baker, "Venezuela: It is decreed a new State of Alarm throughout the country due to
COVID-19 until October 6, 2020," 2020.
163 Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, article 338, 1999.
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"indiscriminate and disproportional measures of internment," which violate their right to
personal liberty and "clearly go beyond preventive home quarantine."167 Additionally,
protests and public demonstrations have ceased given the mandatory quarantine,
therefore, it could also be interpreted as a violation of the right to freedom of expression
taking into account the previous history of censorship and repression in the country. "The
curtailment of rights related to civic protest and public opinion is very much within the
Executive’s interest," say two senior research fellows at Max Planck Institute for
Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg.168 Moreover, the
continuous suspension of certain guarantees, considering the 26 decreed states of
emergency in the span of four years, takes away the importance of the rights in question
since they have been non-existent and/or inconsistent for a long period of time because of
the amount of extensions and newly decreed states of emergency. In Venezuela, the
absence of the characteristic legality that should prevail during the decree of a state of
emergency is one of the main reasons why these measures "have been conducive to a
greater legal insecurity, arbitrariness in governmental action, and human rights
violations."169
The Venezuelan crisis has worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic. The
government published numbers of cases and deaths due to the virus are hard to believe
due to the previous history of censorship and lack of transparency in the country. Taking
this into consideration, the government has also "threatened, harassed, and arrested jour-
169 Casal Hernández, Jesús María; Morales Antoniazzi, Mariela, 2020.
168 Casal Hernández, Jesús María; Morales Antoniazzi, Mariela, 2020.
167 Casal Hernández, Jesús María; Morales Antoniazzi, Mariela, "States of Emergency without Rule of
Law: The Case of Venezuela," Verfassungsblog, 2020.
46
nalists, opposition politicians, and health-care workers for speaking out regarding
COVID-19 and the response to the pandemic."170 According to the US Department of
State "2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Venezuela," the NGO Espacio
Público documented 59 arrests from March to September 2020 due to COVID-19
coverage, and the NGO United Doctors for Venezuela documented the arrest of 12
health-care professionals who were demanding personal protective equipment at the San
Cristobal Central Hospital.171 As previously mentioned, the health system in Venezuela
was not ready for this pandemic—and it continues to be woefully incable to deal with it.
In addition, health professionals do not only have to work during a global pandemic in a
country where there are not even the necessary resources in the first place, but they also
have to suffer harassment and fear of denouncing the situation they find themselves in.
Finally, regardless of exceptions for journalists and press members to travel during the
official quarantine, Maduro's government has violated the right to freedom of movement
of the aforementioned group of individuals.172
Maduro's regime has increased food prices, basic services, fuel and taxes, arguing
that they are equal to those used in other countries. Nevertheless, since around May 2020
the minimum wage of a worker Venezuelan has hovered around 400,000 Bolívares
monthly, equivalent, as noted earlier, to roughly $2.173 This fact highlights that the
comparison made by the president is perversely out of place in the Venezuelan context.
Furthermore, despite the state of alarm and mandatory quarantine in the country, mining
173 Observatorio Venezolano de Conflictividad Social OVCS, "Venezuela Mayo 2020," 2020.
172 US Department of State, 2020.
171 US Department of State, 2020.
170 US Department of State, "2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Venezuela," 2020.
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activities have not ceased and are performed without the adequate sanitary protocols to
prevent the spread of the virus.174 Consequently, the state of Bolivar has had one of the
highest numbers of confirmed cases, including the transmission of the virus in indigenous
communities.175 This shows the lack of thought about indigenous groups and their
vulnerability to the pandemic, even more since they are isolated from the cities where the
medical attention centers are usually located.
175 International Commission of Jurists Advocated for Justice and Human Rights, "Venezuela: indigenous
peoples face deteriorating human rights situation due to mining, violence and COVID-19 pandemic," 2020.
174 International Commission of Jurists Advocated for Justice and Human Rights, "Venezuela: indigenous
peoples face deteriorating human rights situation due to mining, violence and COVID-19 pandemic," 2020.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
PREVENTION THROUGH DETERRENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Prevention Through Deterrence Techniques
The Venezuelan government has been implementing questionable measures that
could be compared to those outlined and applied in the "Border Patrol Strategic Plan
1994 and Beyond," published in the United States in the mentioned year.176 The "Border
Patrol Strategic Plan 1994 and Beyond" was a document that introduced the term and
"strategy" of "prevention through deterrence." This document's goal was to introduce a
new set of policies that would deter illegal crossings of its southern border with Mexico,
and that was expected to "improve control of the border."177 The geographic environment
in the United States southern border varies from lakes, rivers, and valleys to mountains
and deserts and temperatures also vary between the geographical points. Thus, one of the
main measures of the published Strategic Plan was to disrupt the traditional entry points
and smuggling routes—also called "avenues of approach"—and force the individuals to
cross over a more hostile terrain. This hostile terrain is not suited for crossings and it is
more suited for enforcement.178 For example, the Sonoran Desert has acted as the "hostile
terrain" given its high temperatures and harsh conditions, maximizing the possibility of
apprehension, or, sadly, death. By raising the risk of being apprehended or dying, it is
believed that illegal aliens would consider it "futile" to try to enter the United States
illegally and, therefore, the illegal crossings would decrease.
178 U.S. Border Patrol, 1994.
177 U.S. Border Patrol, 1994.
176 U.S. Border Patrol, "Border Patrol Strategic Plan 1994 and Beyond," July, 1994.
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According to the Strategic Plan, the areas with the highest illegal entry flow were
Southern California, West Texas and New Mexico, South and South Central Texas, and
Arizona and it was developed around four different phases. Phase I consists in achieving
control of the border in San Diego and El Paso given their position in the previously
mentioned entry flow areas ranking. The first phase emphasizes the importance of
identifying areas affected by shifts in traffic patterns, since traffic will possibly shift to
other avenues of approach when deterrence measures are implemented. Phase II consists
in achieving control of South Texas and Tucson corridors due to the illegal flow shift
explained before. Next, Phase III consists in gaining control of the remainder of the
Southwest border. Finally, Phase IV consists of gaining control of all the United States
borders and adjusting to the flow in new areas of activity. The following actions are some
of the ones encouraged in order to achieve the desired level of border control: barriers
(fencing, lighting, bollards), increase visibility to promote public awareness, improve
technology to maximize personnel and enhance mobility flexibility, increase joint
operations (and share equipment) with Customs, Drug Enforcement Administration,
Local Law Enforcement Agencies. Some of the indicators of success or effectiveness of
these phases include the following: initial increase of arrests and entry attempts,
increased instances of more sophisticated methods of smuggling at checkpoints, fee
increase by smugglers, fewer returnees, potential for more protests against immigration
policy, more violence at attempted entries. A study published in 1997 titled "Illegal
Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More Evaluation Needed"
also considers deaths of aliens attempting entry as one of the indicators for measuring the
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effectiveness of the strategy to deter illegal entry along the Southwest border.179 The
study did not find an increase in the overall number of illegal alien deaths but found an
increase in the number of deaths from environmental exposure (falls, hypothermia,
dehydration) in the remote areas where immigrants had traveled in an effort to avoid
areas of greater enforcement along the border.180 In the case of the Sonoran desert
dehydration is common in individuals due to the extreme temperatures.
180 U.S. GAO, 1997, pp. 50.
179 U.S. GAO, "Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More Evaluation
Needed," 1997, pp. 84.
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Venezuelan Response to Returnees and Human Rights Implications
Given the complicated circumstances that Venezuelan migrants find themselves in
Colombia—lack of job opportunities and, therefore, of income; lack of access to health
services in a global pandemic; xenophobia, stigmatization, and discrimination; among
others—many have tried returning to their country and were surprised by several
measures taken by Maduro's government in order to deter their return. Venezuelan
citizens who have been forced to return to their country due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
"survive in deplorable conditions at the Puntos de Atención Social Integral (PASI)"—
which translates to "Comprehensive Social Care Points."181 The PASI shelters are
quarantine confinement centers where the returnees are sent once they return to their
country; they would have to stay there for a period of 14 or 21 days depending on their
state of destination.182 In addition, many returnees have been required to stay in
quarantine centers for several weeks in addition to the 14 days recommended by the
World Health Organization, due to delays in COVID-19 diagnostic tests and
unnecessarily complex testing protocol.183 The Venezuelan Government claimed that the
installation of these 17 centers was to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in the national
territory, but they have been ineffective in protecting the population and
counterproductive since the conditions only make the migrants even more vulnerable.
These centers have unsanitary conditions and are overcrowded.184 Returnees are forced to
quarantine, with little access to food, water, electricity, hygiene products, or medical
184 Bloomberg, "Maduro Welcome Migrants Home By Locking Them in Sweltering Camps," 2020.
183 Human Rights Watch, "Venezuela: Abusive Treatment of Returnees," 2020.
182 United Nations, "Más de 70.000 personas han retornado a Venezuela desde abril por la crisis de
COVID-19," 2020.
181 Human Rights Watch, "Venezuela: Urgent Aid Needed to Combat Covid-19," 2020.
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attention. Some returnees who protested such conditions were threatened with getting
arrested.185 The conditions in these shelters are not only inhumane, but also promote the
spread of the virus between returnees due to the lack of space for social distancing and
the scarce resources provided.
Another measure from the Venezuelan government involves the acceptance of
only a limited amount of daily entries of Venezuelan returnees through the Colombian
border.186 A maximum of 300 people is allowed to cross daily through legal means.
Consequently, illegal crossings through what is colloquially called "trochas" have become
more and more recurrent and common. "Trochas" are the alternate routes to cross the
border, where smugglers and armed groups charge the migrants from 5,000 to 150,000
Colombian pesos to cross—$1.35 to $40.42, an extremely high amount for Venezuelans
considering their minimum wage in Venezuela and their employment situation in
Colombia.187 These unofficial trails involve harsh weather and environment conditions,
such as the previous example on the Sonoran Desert in the United States, and smugglers
or armed groups take advantage of the situation of the migrants and as a consequence
they are charged with the promise of crossing back to their country.
In addition, on August 20th, 2020 the Venezuelan government restricted the entry
of Venezuelan citizens through the border passages in the state of Táchira, specifically
through the Puente Internacional Simón Bolívar, and the military presence increased in
187 El Tiempo, "Incrementan control en trochas con Venezuela ante retorno de migrantes," 2020.
186 Agencia EFE, 2020.
185 Human Rights Watch, "Venezuela: Abusive Treatment of Returnees," 2020.
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the area.188 The reasons given by the Venezuelan authorities have to do with the high
number of people who did not comply with the quarantine requirements due to
COVID-19 in the state of Táchira. Due to this decision, the director of the Colombian
Migration department, Juan Francisco Espinosa, also gave instructions to suspend the
transit of buses with Venezuelan citizens to this crossing point.189 The militarization of
the border is therefore used as a strategy to impede Venezuelan citizens from returning
back to their own country and to instill fear among the would-be returners, making them
second-guess their initial return plans. In fact, the Global Shelter Cluster found that
"through September 2020 there was a noticeable decrease in the number of spontaneous
returns," allowing again for the opportunity to compare these measures with the ones
exposed by means of consideration of the "Border Patrol Strategic Plan 1994 and
Beyond."190
Additionally, Iris Varela—a high-ranking Venezuelan government official,
currently deputy and first vice president of the National Assembly (though she has held a
number of other offices before)—officially proposed in the National Assembly that
Venezuelans that emigrated out of the country should have their nationality revoked and
their property confiscated.191 This proposal is completely unconstitutional since article 35
of the Venezulan Constitution states that "Venezuelans by birth cannot be deprived of
their nationality. The Venezuelan nationality by naturalization can be revoked only by a
191 Infobae, "Iris Varela propuso a la Asamblea Nacional de Maduro confiscar los bienes y revocar la
nacionalidad de los venezolanos fuera del país," 2021.
190 Global Shelter Cluster https://www.sheltercluster.org/venezuela/factsheets/2020-09
189 Tomillo, Manuel, "Gobierno de Maduro cierra paso a venezolanos por el puente Simón Bolívar este
#21Ago," 2020.
188 Tomillo, Manuel, "Gobierno de Maduro cierra paso a venezolanos por el puente Simón Bolívar este
#21Ago," 2020.
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judgment handed down by a court in accordance with law."192 Furthermore, article 34
states that "the Venezuelan nationality is not lost upon electing or acquiring another
nationality."193 Besides being unconstitutional, it also does not agree with international
law since article 6(b) from the Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to Leave and Return
explains how "no person shall be deprived of nationality or citizenship in order to exile or
to prevent that person from exercising the right to enter his or her country.194 Finally, the
case of the United States' Supreme Court Trop v. Dulles concluded that expatriation is a
cruel and unusual penal punishment, since citizenship is "not a license that expires upon
misbehavior."195 These examples show how using expatriation as "punishment,"
completely contradicts not only international and domestic law, but also shows that other
countries like the United States also believe this should not be permitted. Sadly, this case
has not been an isolated one in the history of the chavismo and madurismo, since in 2014
the Cuban-Venezuelan actress Maria Conchita Alonso was also undergoing the process of
getting her nationality revoked because she expressed a desired for the U.S. intervening
in the country to depose the current government—despite the fact that no such process
even exists in Venezuelan law.196
Finally, the government has criminalized, stigmatized, and discriminated against
Venezuelan individuals who seek to return home.197 The sad reality of these migrants is
that not only did they have to face discrimination in a foreign country, but also now in
197 Organization of American States, 2020.
196 BBC News, "Venezuela inicia proceso para revocar nacionalidad a la actriz María Conchita Alonso,"
2014.
195 Legal Information Institute, "Albert L. TROP, Petitioner, v. John Foster DULLES, as Secretary of State
of the United States and United States Department of State," Cornell Law School, 1958.
194 Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to Leave and Return, article 6(b), 1986.
193 Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 1999.
192 Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 1999.
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their own. As an example, president Nicolas Maduro accused returning Venezuelans of
being “bioterrorists” that wanted to purposefully bring the COVID-19 virus into the
country's borders.198 Furthermore, high-ranking officials in the Venezuelan government
and Maduro have publicly stated that they think the migrants return because of “karma”
and they have called them “fascists and "camouflaged coup plotters” who do not deserve
assistance.199 The president also said that migrants crossing through illegal passageways
were “contaminating their communities” and “killing their families.”200 David
Smolansky, an OAS commissioner, believes that the "cruel and degrading treatment
against Venezuelans who return to the country through border crossings, endangers their
physical and psychological integrity and could lead to genocide."201 This stigmatization
and intimidation of an already vulnerable population only contributes to the unbearable
conditions that the returnees have to confront. Moreover, Freddy Bernal, another
high-ranking government official who has held a host of important government posts
since the early days of Chavismo (he was one of Chavez's early comrades in coup
attempts), established that the outside of houses would be marked with paint to indicate
those who allegedly crossed the “controls” provided, threatening the citizens instead of
providing them the protections that the laws guarantee.202 The criminalization and
otherwise terrorizing of these Venezuelan citizens is highly criticizable for violating their
right to honor, since it is an affront to their dignity, and for disrespecting their private life,
family, and home according to the published OAS report.203
203 Organization of American States, 2020.
202 Organization of American States, 2020
201 Deutsche Welle, "Retorno a Venezuela: segregación y estigmatización," 2020.
200 Human Rights Watch, Stuck at Venezuela’s Border with Covid-19 All Around, 2020.
199 The Washington Post, "El gobierno de Maduro debe dejar de estigmatizar a quienes retornan por
COVID-19," 2020.
198 Welsh, Teresa. "Returning Venezuelans subjected to 'inhuman' treatment, report says," Devex, 2020.
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As previously mentioned, article 13(2) of the UDHR "everyone has the right to
leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country," explicitly states the
concept of the right to return to one's country.204 This, along with state practices, has led
to the formation of a norm of customary international law that assures that an individual
outside his or her country has the right to return to it. Furthermore, The Commission on
Human Rights has affirmed in past circumstances, such as the Bosnia precedent in 1997,
the right of all persons to return.205 Since at least 2014, the government of Nicolás
Maduro has been using different tactics and committing multiple human rights violations,
however, in this specific case Maduro's government has deprived returners of the right to
return and free transit, prohibiting their entry and preventing Venezuelans who manage to
cross the borders from circulating freely within the national territory to return to their
states of residence.206 Consequently, the strategy of "prevention through deterrence" is not
used as a means to deter immigrants but to impede the return of the country's own
citizens. Therefore, the severity of the measures applied by the government are clear and
its consequences and impacts are severe in the human rights aspect of the citizens trying
to return.
In the first chapter of this thesis, specifically in the section titled "Right to return
(as a citizen)," it was exposed that Hurst Hannum mentioned that restrictions to the right
to return could be legitimate if, for example, it was to limit the spreading of a disease.207
Moreover, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in article
207 Hannum, Hurst, 1987, pp. 4.
206 Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights "Pact of San José de
Costa Rica", article 22 Number 5, 1969.
205 Rosand, Eric, "The Right to Return Under International Law Following Mass Dislocation: The Bosnia
Precedent?" vol. 19, issue 4, Michigan Journal of International Law, 1998.
204 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.
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12(3) also mentions public health as a lawful reason to apply these restrictions. Given the
COVID-19 pandemic one could think it applies to the Venezuelan case and, therefore, it
would be legitimate for the current Venezueln government to restrict the access of
Venezuelan returnees without violating international and domestic law. However, in this
specific case this restriction cannot be considered as legitimate since they are being used
as punishment for the Venezuelan's that emigrated before the pandemic. PASI camps do
not fulfil basic human rights obligations or responsibilities and through previous
examples we observe how even the inalienable rights have been taken away from the
returnees. Xenophobia and discrimination has been encouraged by government officials
in multiple and repetitive occassions, including Iris Varela's efforts of stripping
Venezuelans that emigrated from their nationality and property. Hannum also specifies
how restrictions in such rights are considered legitimate if "imposed for limited purposes
in a fair a non-discriminatory manner," which is clearly not the case in Venezuela.208
Measures taken by the government are neither fair nor non-discriminatory and,
consequently, there is no justification for the events that have taken place against
nationals.
208 Hannum, Hurst, 1987, pp. 4.
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CONCLUSION
Venezuela has been a country in crisis for several years, gradually worsening
when Hugo Chavez Frías assumed the presidency. After Chavez's death, Nicolás Maduro
assumed power and the situation rapidly worsened. Under the Presidency of Nicolás
Maduro (2013-present), Venezuela's economy collapsed, shortages of basic supplies
became widespread, human rights abuses became prominent, insecurity rates increased
drastically, censorship became a dominant element in the country, only to mention a few
of the components explained throughout this thesis. These and many other factors
prompted the massive migration of Venezuelans to other Latin American countries,
including the neighboring Colombia. This emigration wave has been characterized as
"migration of despair."
After a considerable number of Venezuelans arrived in Colombia, they were
offered some protections, for example, temporary legal status. However, when the
COVID-19 pandemic started, this group of migrants found themselves in a difficult living
situation—from lack of work and income to being categorized as "the other" and
experiencing xenophobia and discrimination. These circumstances worsened particularly
when Colombia decreed a national lockdown. Therefore, many decided to return to their
home country, Venezuela, and networks directly linked to Venezuelan migration
developed in Latin American countries in order to assist this group of citizens on their
return. In Colombia, organizations such as “Asociación Ávila Monserrate”, “Somos
Panas Colombia”, “Venezolanos por Decisión”, “Venezolanos en Colombia”, among
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others, have played a significant role in informing, denouncing, and helping in this
arduous process.209
To the returnees surprise, Maduro's administration started implementing measures
to impede their return, thus violating international and domestic laws. On September 9th,
2020 The Organization of American States (OAS) issued a report on the "Situation of
Venezuelans who have returned and seek to return to their country in the context of
COVID-19."210 The non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch published an
article reporting the "abusive treatment of the returnees" and describing the humanitarian
response that this situation has caused.211 The situation that has been denounced includes
deplorable quarantine conditions—no food and water, non-existent social distancing, lack
of access to medical attention, considering stripping returnees of their nationality and
property, setting limits on how many Venezuelan citizens can enter the country in a day.
UN groups, including UNOCHA and UNHCR, as well as nongovernmental groups, have
provided support to returnees and have set up temporary shelters, medical tents, and
supplied protective equipment or water and sanitation improvements.212
The research question of this thesis is the human rights implications of the
measures taken by the Venezuelan government in the Venezuelan-Colombian border
during the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the magnitude of attention that this issue has
received from the international community points to the severity of the impact and
212 Human Rights Watch, "Venezuela: Abusive Treatment of Returnees," 2020.
211 Human Rights Watch, "Venezuela: Abusive Treatment of Returnees," 2020.
210 Organization of American States, "Situation of Venezuelans who have returned and seek to return to
their country in the context of COVID-19," 2020.
209 Immobility in the Americas, "Venezuela."
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consequences of these migration processes on the individuals affected and the human
rights implications are clear and worrisome. In addition, this thesis argues that the
mentioned measures' goal is the prevention or impediment of the return of citizens
through "deterrence techniques" that, on the contrary, have been historically used by
other countries to deter immigration. Well-founded evidence allows us to conclude that
these measures are indeed similar to those in the "Border Patrol Strategic Plan 1994 and
Beyond" and, through their implementation, the Venezuelan government is violating its
own citizens "right to return."
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